Through my investigation of Counterintelligence: Crime and Violence
Prevention, I have discovered a valuable security guidelines for eligibility for
a clearance or access to classified information from the government. I would
recommend that you use these guidelines to select your friends, select your
business associates and avoid problems. Please keep in mind that no one is
perfect and these guidelines should be used as a guide to make sure you avoid
any physical, mental and spiritual problems or games. By applying these guidelines, it
will allow you to prevent crime and violence while making sure that your morals,
ethics and honor remain intact. Most of the public information is copied to make
sure that it remains in a correct government legal format.
Defense Personnel Security Research
Center. Security Clearances and the Protection of National Security Information:
Law and Procedures by Sheldon I Cohen, DPSTC, Monterey, CA, 2000. OMB No. 0704-0188. December, 2000.
The following adjudicative guidelines are established for all United States
civilian and military personnel, consultants, contractors, employees of
contractors, licensees, certificate holders and grantees and to any other person
acting for an agency who requires access to classified information, to Sensitive
Compartmented Information, or to Special Access Programs.
The guidelines for evaluating a person’s eligibility for a clearance or
access to classified information are the following:
The Process is based upon an examination of a person's life in a time frame that
allows a proper determination in security eligibility. There must be a careful
"common sense" weighing of a number of variables, known as the
"whole person concept," in reaching a determination. This includes
information from both past and present, favorable and unfavorable about the
person. In evaluating the relevance of an individual’s conduct, an adjudicator
must consider the following factors:
The Adjudicative Guidelines require that each case must be judged on its own
merits, but that any doubt must be resolved against granting access to
classified information. In the end, there must be a finding that it is clearly
consistent with national security to grant an individual a clearance and access.
Although adverse information concerning a single guideline may be
insufficient to require an unfavorable determination, an individual may be
disqualified if information reflects a recent or recurring pattern of
questionable judgment, irresponsibility or emotionally unstable behavior.
Notwithstanding the "whole person" concept, an investigation may be
terminated if significant, reliable, disqualifying, adverse information becomes
apparent. The final determination remains the responsibility of the Department
or agency having the classified information.’"
When information of a security concern becomes known about an individual who
currently holds an eligibility for access to classified information, the
adjudicator must also consider whether the person:
After evaluating the information of security concern, the adjudicator may
consider temporarily suspending the person’s access pending a final
adjudication. Where the information is not serious enough to warrant a
revocation of a security clearance, the clearance may be continued with a
warning that future incidents of a similar nature may result in revocation of
access.
The importance of the "whole person" concept cannot be over
emphasized. Conduct by one person that is unacceptable might not disqualify
another. For example, the use of a variety of drugs by a person in high school
or college, even to a substantial degree; might not disqua1ify that person,
while a single use of marijuana by an adult while that person held a security
clearance would probably cause loss of a clearance. Also, a person active in his
community and with a record of service to others would be more likely to retain
his clearance after being caught shoplifting during a period of emotional
stress, than someone with a series of minor traffic offenses and arrests for
public disorder involving alcohol.’30 Someone with a diligent work
record and a history of adherence to rules and regulations would be more likely
to retain his clearance after a single violation of security regulations than
someone with the same violation who habitually disregarded work rules.
In an adjudication of an alleged violation of the guidelines, testimony or
affidavits by a spouse, parent, clergy, physician, supervisor, coworker, or
neighbor, as appropriate to the situation, can often provide information about
the individual’s "whole person" which would not be found in the
investigative file of the alleged violation of the guidelines.’3’
Guideline A—Allegiance to the United States
The Concern. An individual must be of unquestioned allegiance to the United
States. The willingness to safeguard classified information is in doubt if there
is any reason to suspect an individual’s allegiance to the United States.
Disqualifying Conditions:
(1) Involvement in any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism,
sedition, or other act whose aim is to overthrow the Government of the United
States or alter the form of government by unconstitutional means;
(2) Association or sympathy with persons who are attempting to commit, or who
are committing, any of the above acts;
(3) Association or sympathy with persons or organizations that advocate the
overthrow of the United States Government, or any state or subdivision, by force
or violence or by other unconstitutional means; or
(4) Involvement in activities which unlawfully advocate or practice the
commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their
rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any state.
Mitigating Conditions:
(1) The individual was unaware of the unlawful aims of the individual or
organization and severed ties upon learning of these;
(2) The individual’s involvement was only with the lawful or humanitarian
aspects of such an organization;
(3) Involvement in the above activities occurred for only a short period of
time and was attributable to curiosity or academic interest; or
(4) The person has had no recent involvement or association with such
activities.
Comments
Guideline A is probably the least-used guideline for denying or revoking a
clearance. The Defense Security Service is required, if it discovers
involvement with sabotage, espionage, treason, or efforts to overthrow the
government by unconstitutional means, to turn the matter over to the appropriate
counterintelligence agency or the FBI for investigation and ultimately criminal
prosecution.’34 More problematic is a person’s involvement with
organizations whose aim is to prevent others from exercising their
constitutional rights, such as the Ku Klux Klan or anti-abortion groups that
engage in acts of physical violence. The line between opinion and action is
often a fine one, and the guideline draws that line at "involvement in
activities." No such line is drawn, however, when it comes to sabotage,
espionage, or treason. In that case, "sympathy" with persons
attempting to commit such acts is sufficient grounds to resolve "any doubt
in favor of the national security."
An issue sometimes arises with organizations having both a
violence-advocating arm and one that provides humanitarian relief While
involvement with only the humanitarian aspects of such an organization is not
grounds for losing a clearance, the argument is made that contributions for such
purpose permits the organization to divert funds, otherwise used for
humanitarian relict to acts of violence.
Guideline B—Foreign Influence
The Concern. A security risk may exist when an individual’s immediate
family, including cohabitants and other persons to whom he or she may be bound
by affection, influence, or obligation are not citizens of the United States or
may be subject to duress. These situations could create the potential for
foreign influence that could result in the compromise of classified information.
Contacts with citizens of other countries or financial interests in other
countries are also relevant to security determinations if they make an
individual potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure.
Disqualifying Conditions:
(1) An immediate family member, or a person to whom the individual has close
ties of affection or obligation, is a citizen of, or resident or present in, a
foreign country;
(2) Sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of their
citizenship status, if the potential for adverse foreign influence or duress
exists;
(3) Relatives, cohabitants, or associates who are connected with any foreign
government,
(4) Failing to report, where required, associations with foreign nationals;
(5) Unauthorized association with a suspected or known collaborator or
employee of a foreign intelligence service;
(6) Conduct which may make the individual vulnerable to coercion,
exploitation, or pressure by a foreign government;
(7) Indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign country are
acting to increase the vulnerability of the individual to possible future
exploitation, coercion or pressure; or
(8) A substantial financial interest in a country, or in any foreign-owned or
foreign-operated business that could make the individual vulnerable to foreign
influence.
Mitigating Conditions:
(1) A determination that the immediate family member (s) (spouse, father,
mother, sons, daughters, brothers, sisters), cohabitant, or associate (s) in
question are not agents of a foreign power or in a position to be exploited by a
foreign power in a way that could force the individual to choose between loyalty
to the person (s) involved and the United States;
(2) Contacts with foreign citizens are the result of official United States
Government business;
(3) Contact and correspondence with foreign citizens are casual and
infrequent;
(4) The individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements
regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons or
organizations from a foreign country; or
(5) Foreign financial interests are minimal and not sufficient to affect the
individual’s security responsibilities.
Comments
As with Guideline A, any concerns regarding contacts with foreign
intelligence organizations or exploitations by foreign governments would be
referred to a counterintelligence organization of’ the United States
Government or the FBI for investigation and possible criminal prosecution. From
a clearance standpoint, what is frequently at issue are first- or second-
generation Americans who have family living with them who have not become
naturalized, or who still have close relatives living in foreign countries. It
is not the allegiance of the person with the clearance that is the concern,
addressed in Guideline A, but the possibility that a foreign government would
attempt to coerce that person by threatening the safety or welfare of the
relatives living abroad. The closer the family tie, the greater the possibility
of influence.’36
Also of concern are the actions of a person traveling in a foreign country
that might make them subject to coercion after returning home, such as an
illicit sexual relationship or the use of drugs. Using agent provocateurs to
secretly photograph otherwise well-intentioned persons in compromising
situations for use in blackmail to acquire gay-eminent secrets is not unknown to
foreign governments.
Guideline C—Foreign Preference
The Concern. When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a
preference for a foreign country over the United States, then he may be prone to
provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the
United States.
Disqualifying Conditions:
(1) The exercise of dual citizenship;
(2) Possession and/or use of a foreign passport;
(3) Military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign country;
(4) Accepting educational, medical, or other benefits, such as retirement and
social welfare, from a foreign country;
(5) Residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship requirements;
(6) Using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business interests in
an-other country;
(7) Seeking or holding political office in the foreign country;
(8) Voting in foreign elections; or
(9) Performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise acting, so as to
serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the
United States.
Mitigating Conditions:
(1) Dual citizenship is based solely on parents’ citizenship or birth in a
foreign country;
(2) Indicators of possible foreign preference (e.g., foreign military
service) occurred before obtaining United States citizenship;
(3) Activity is sanctioned by the United States; or
(4) The individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship.
Comments
Becoming a naturalized United States citizen does not automatically end
foreign citizenship, as many foreign countries permit dual citizenship. Also,
some countries grant automatic citizenship to the offspring of their citizens
regardless of where the children are born. It is the exercise of rights under a
foreign citizenship or the acceptance of benefits from a foreign government
because of that citizenship that is of concern. Those acts are
indicators of possible dual loyalty or possible coercion through the termination
of foreign benefits. While renunciation of a foreign citizenship is not
absolutely required, it is the clearest indicator of a single loyalty to the
United States.’39
Guidance D—Sexual Behavior
The Concern. Sexual behavior is a security concern if it involves a criminal
indicates a personality or emotional disorder, subjects the individual to coercion,
exploitation, or duress, or reflects lack of judgment or discretion. Sexual orientation
or preference may not be used as a basis for or a disqualifying factor in
determining a person’s eligibility for a security clearance.
Disqualifying Conditions:
(1) Sexual behavior of a criminal nature, whether or not the individual has
been prosecuted;
(2) Compulsive or addictive sexual behavior when the person is unable to stop
a pattern of self-destructive or high-risk behavior or that which is symptomatic
of a personality disorder;
(3) Sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable to coercion,
exploitation, or duress; or
(4) Sexual behavior of a public nature and/or that which reflects lack of
discretiol1 or judgment.’4’
Mitigating Conditions:
(1) The behavior occurred during or prior to adolescence, and there is no
evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature;
(2) The behavior was not recent, and there is no evidence of subsequent
conduct of a similar nature;
(3) There is no other evidence of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or
emotional instability; or
(4) The behavior no longer serves as a basis for coercion, exploitation, or
duress.
Comments
Sexual behavior as a basis for denying or revoking a security clearance is
fraught with the most uncertainty of any of the guidelines. Behavior that is
legal in one state might be illegal in another, such as cohabitation by
unmarried consenting adults. Adultery may be considered the exercise of poor
judgment, but if the spouse forgives or accepts such behavior, it is
questionable whether, in the mores of today’s society, it should be a reason
for denying a security clearance.142 It is unquestionable, however,
that this guideline prohibits clearly criminal behavior, such as pedophilia or
incest. In addressing these issues, the "whole person"
concept and the "common sense determination" of the adjudicative
authorities become most important.
This guideline (and Executive Order 12968) specifically excludes sexual
orientation or preference as a basis for denying a clearance. However, if one’s
sexual orientation or preference is not openly acknowledged, that becomes a
security concern because of the potential for coercion. That concern for
coercion is not limited to only homosexual activity but also to heterosexual
activity such as adultery which might be cause for blackmail.
Whether to disclose a homosexual or lesbian relationship can be a Hobson’s
choice in relation to keeping a security clearance. Under the "Don’t ask—Don’t
tell" policy of the military, disclosure of a homosexual or lesbian
relationship, except in the context of a security clearance investigation, would
lead to dismissal from military service, but failure to openly acknowledge such
a relationship could result in the loss of a security clearance necessary for a
military assignment. Disclosure of some types of sexual conduct during the
course of a security clearance investigation may be reported to the military
service, which could lead to a criminal investigation or an administrative
discharge. In the case of an officer, failure to disclose would cause the loss
of a security clearance that surely would lead to dismissal from military
service, as a clearance is a prerequisite to such service.
Guideline E—Personal Conduct
The Concern. Conduct involving questionable judgment, untrustworthiness,
unreliability, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules
and regulations could indicate that in an unfavorable clearance action or
administrative termination of further processing for clearance eligibility:
(1) Refusal to undergo or cooperate with required security processing,
including medical and psychological testing; or
(2) Refusal to complete required security forms, releases, or provide full,
frank and truthful answers to unlawful questions of investigators, security
officials, or other official representatives in connection with a personnel
security or trustworthiness determination:
Disqualifying Conditions:
(1) Reliable, unfavorable information provided by associates, employers,
coworkers, neighbors, and other acquaintances;
(2) The deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant and
material facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history
statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment
qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance
eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities;
(3) Deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning
relevant and material matters to an investigator, security official, competent
medical authority, or other representative in connection with a personnel
security or trustworthiness determination;
(4) Persona! conduct or concealment of information that may increase an
individual’s vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or duties, such as
engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person’s personal,
professional, or community standing or render the person susceptible to
blackmail;
(5) A pattern of dishonesty or rule violations, including violation of
any written or recorded agreement made between the individual and the agency; or
(6) Association with persons involved in criminal activity.
Mitigating Conditions:
(1) The information was unsubstantiated or not pertinent to a determination
of judgment, trustworthiness, or reliability;
(2) The falsification was an isolated incident, was not recent, and the
individual has subsequently provided correct information voluntarily;
(3) The individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the
falsification before being confronted with the facts;
(4) Omission of material facts was caused or significantly contributed to by
improper or inadequate advice of authorized personnel, and the previously omitted
information was promptly and fully provided;
(5) The individual has taken positive steps to significantly reduce or
eliminate vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or duress;
(6) A refusal to cooperate was based on advice from legal counsel or other
officials that the individual was not required to comply with security
processing requirements, and, upon being made aware of the requirement, fully
and truthfully provided the requested information; or
(7) Association with persons involved in criminal activities has ceased.
Comments
Guideline E is a catchall for any types of conduct not otherwise prescribed
and is an overlap of all of the other guidelines. This guideline is a
combination of former Criterion "I" which barred "acts of
omission or commission that indicated poor judgment, unreliability, and
untrustworthiness," and former Criterion "0" which barred
"any knowing and willful falsification, cover-up, concealment,
misrepresentation, or omission of a material fact" from any written or oral
statement given to the government. Because a violation of any other guideline is
also a violation of this one, it is the government’s practice, when charging a
violation of any of the other guidelines to generally also charge a violation of
Guideline E.
Failure to cooperate with a personnel security investigation is virtually an
automatic disqualifier. Also, providing false or misleading
information during the investigation will most likely disqualify the Subject. To
overcome that disqualifier, the subject of the investigation must show that he
misunderstood the request for information or had some reasonable explanation,
such as embarrassment if his employer learned of the information, or that he
wanted to make a full personal disclosure to the government investigator.
Disclosures made during a polygraph after repeated evasions are not likely to
overcome the disqualifier.
Any omitted facts must be material. For example, if in providing an
employment history, a part-time job during high school was omitted, it would not
be grounds for denying a clearance to a Ph.D. physicist, unless there was
something at the job, such as criminal involvement, which the applicant sought
to hide.
A frequent reason for denying of a clearance under this guideline is the
failure to file federal and state income tax returns. Though no taxes may be
owed, the failure to file is considered an unwillingness to follow rules and
regulations and a violation of criminal law. Generally, if a person completes
his filings by the time of the adjudication, a clearance will be granted.
However, if there are subsequent failures to file, as often occurs, the
clearance will generally be revoked.
This guideline permits an open ended inquiry when disqualification can be
based on "reliable, unfavorable information provided by associates,
employers, coworkers, neighbors, and other acquaintances." A disgruntled
neighbor may report the unkempt state of the subject’s front lawn or that his
house was not regularly painted to neighborhood standards. Supervisors may
report that the person did not take direction well or did not socialize with
coworkers. Subjective reports such as these in the record of investigation have
been used as a basis to charge that a person should not have a security
clearance because of questionable judgment.
Guideline
F—Financial Considerations
The Concern. An individual who is financially overextended is at risk of
having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds. Unexplained affluence is
often linked to proceeds from financially profitable criminal acts.
Disqualifying Conditions:
(1) A history of not meeting financial obligations;
(2) Deceptive or illegal financial practices such as embezzlement, employee,
theft, check fraud, income tax evasion, expense account fraud, filing deceptive
loan statement, and other intentional financial breaches of trust;
(3) Inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts;
(4) Unexplained affluence; or
(5) Financial problems that are linked to gambling, drug abuse,
alcoholism, or other issues of security concern.
Mitigating Conditions:
(1) The behavior was not recent;
(2) It was an isolated incident;
(3) The conditions that resulted in the behavior were largely beyond the
person’s control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected
medical emergency, a death, divorce or separation);
(4) The person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem, and
there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is under
control;
(5) The affluence resulted from a legal source; or
(6) The individual
initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve
debts.
Comments
History has shown that the need for money has often been the cause of
traitors revealing national security information. Excessive debt is viewed as
one of the most serious possible sources of coercion. As the guideline
indicates, debt itself is not as critical as the reasons for one’s being in
debt and the efforts being taken to resolve it. Filing for bankruptcy
does not cause an automatic revocation of a clearance. If the bankruptcy
resulted from a profligate use of credit for purchasing luxuries, it will be
viewed as resulting from poor judgment and lack of concern for others. If, on
the other hand, it was caused by factors beyond the debtor’s control, such as
unexpected medical bills, the filing may be viewed positively since
excessive debt will have been eliminated as a possible source of coercion. Debt
alone will not cause the revocation of a clearance if the person is
making good-faith efforts to repay the debt within their means.
Unexplained affluence as a basis for denying or revoking a clearance is, as
has been previously, in the Adjudicative Criteria. Had it been applied in the
case of former CIA employee, Aldrich Ames, who was able to buy, unnoticed, a
$540,000 house for cash on a mid-level government salary, some of his espionage
might have been prevented. Statutes and regulations requiring financial
disclosure as a condition for a security clearance enacted since his exposure
should prevent a reoccurrence.
Guideline G—Alcohol Consumption
The Concern. Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of
questionable judgment, unreliability, failure to control impulses and increases
the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information due to
carelessness.
Disqualifying Conditions:
(1) Alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving while under the
influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse, or other criminal incidents related
to alcohol use;
(2) Alcohol-related incidents at work, such as reporting for work or duty in
an intoxicated or impaired condition or drinking on the job;
(3) Diagnosis by a credentialed medical professional (e.g., physician,
clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence;
(4) Evaluation of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence by a licensed clinical
social worker, who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol treatment program;
(5) Habitual or binge-consumption of alcohol to the point of impaired
judgment; or
(6) Consumption of alcohol, subsequent to a diagnosis of alcoholism by a
credentialed medical professional and following completion of an alcohol
rehabilitation program.
Mitigating Conditions:
(1) The alcohol-related incidents do not indicate a pattern;
(2) The problem occurred a number of years ago, and there is no indication of
a recent problem;
(3) Positive changes in behavior supportive of sobriety, or
(4) Following diagnosis of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence, the
individual has successfully completed inpatient or outpatient rehabilitation
along with aftercare requirements,
participates
frequently in meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous or a similar organization, has
abstained from alcohol for at least 12 months, and received a favorable
prognosis by a credentialed medical professional or a licensed clinical social
worker who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol treatment program.
Comments
Alcohol, ding abuse and financial instability are the three most common
reasons for denial or loss of a security clearance. The government
need not show that the individual is an
alcoholic,
an alcohol abuser, or alcohol dependent. Several incidents of alcohol-related
incidents at or away from work are sufficient to question a person’s judgment
or reliability.158 The more serious the incident the fewer incidents
will be required to revoke a clearance. Even if there have been no incidents,
excessive consumption alone can be the basis for denial or loss of a clearance.
The disqualifying conditions of this guideline are the easiest in theory and
the hardest in practice to overcome. Ideally, if a person enters and
successfully completes an alcohol
rehabilitation program, and abstains
from alcohol for at least 12 months, the clearance should be restored.
Accomplishing that, however, is sometimes extremely difficult. Despite the
minimum of a year’s abstinence as stated in the guideline, adjudicative
authorities generally look for at least two to three years before they will
restore a clearance.
Guideline H—Drug
Involvement
The Concern. Improper or illegal involvement with drugs raises questions
regarding an individual’s willingness or ability to protect classified
information. Drug abuse or dependence may impair social or occupational
functioning, increasing the risk of an unauthorized disclosure of classified
information.
Drugs are defined as mood- and behavior-altering substances, and include (a)
drug, materials, and other chemical compounds identified and listed in the
Controlled Substances Act of 1970, as amended (e.g., marijuana or cannabis,
depressants, narcotics, stimulants, and hallucinogens), and (b) inhalants and
other similar substances. Drug abuse is the illegal use of a drug or use of a
legal drug in a manner that deviates from approved medical direction.
Disqualifying Conditions:
(1) Any drug abuse;
(2) Illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing, manufacture,
purchase, sale, or distribution;
(3) Diagnosis by a credentialed medical professional (e.g., physician,
clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of drug abuse or drug dependence;
(4) Evaluation of drug abuse or drug dependence by a licensed clinical social
worker, who is a staff member of a recognized drug treatment program; or
(5) Failure to successfully complete a drug treatment program prescribed by a
credentialed medical professional. Recent drug involvement, especially following
the granting of a security clearance, or an expressed intent not to discontinue
use, will almost invariably result in an unfavorable determination.
Mitigating Conditions:
(I) The drug involvement was not recent;
(2) The drug involvement was an isolated or aberration event;
(3) A demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future; or
(4) Satisfactory completion of a prescribed drug treatment program including
rehabilitation and aftercare requirements, without recurrence of abuse, and a
favorable prognosis by a credentialed medical professional.
Comments
Drug involvement is a security concern because of the possible impairment of
judgment and because of its indicativeness of a person’s selective adherence
to the law. While some would argue that smoking a marijuana cigarette to relax
on the weekend is no more impairing than drinking a beer, the fact remains that
marijuana is illegal and alcohol is not.
Any illegal drug use, possession, purchase, sale, or distribution is grounds
for denial or revocation of a clearance. While the former Adjudicative Criteria
were very specific in listing the recency of use and the amount and type of
illegal substance used as factors to be considered in mitigation, the current
guideline simply requires that it was "not recent," and "an
isolated or aberration event."’6’ Wide latitude is left to
the adjudicative body to consider mitigating facts, and there is no assurance of
consistency from board to board or case to case.
Finding anyone graduating from college today who has not used illegal
substances at some time is difficult. If the test were that only a person who
never used or abused drugs could get a clearance, there would probably be few
people in government or the defense industry under the age of 60. For that
reason, much latitude is given to substance abuse in high school and college.’63
Once a person has graduated, however, the assumption is that he has
entered the working world and matured much less leeway is given after that time.
When prior substance abuse is self-reported in a personnel security
questionnaire, the individual will be asked during a personal interview whether
he intends to refrain from the use of any illegal substances in the future.
Unless an unqualified "yes" is given, he will be denied a clearance.
No leeway will be given to any drug abuse while one holds a clearance. The
government adheres to a zero-tolerance drug policy. Drug abuse after a clearance
is granted is considered a willful breach of security regulations and will be
grounds for revocation of the clearance and loss of a job, if it is a job for
which a clearance is necessary.166
Guideline I—Emotional, Mental, and Personality Disorders
The Concern. Emotional, mental and personality disorders can cause a
significant deficit in an individual’s psychological, social, and occupational
functioning. These disorders are of security concern because they may indicate a
defect in judgment, reliability, or stability. A credentialed mental health
professional (e.g., clinical psychologist or psychiatrist), employed by,
acceptable to, or approved by; the government, should be utilized in evaluating
potentially disqualifying and mitigating information fully and properly, and,
particularly, for consultation with the individual’s mental health care
provider.
Disqualifying Conditions:
(1) An opinion by a credentialed mental health professional that the
individual has a condition or treatment chat may indicate a defect in judgment,
reliability, or stability;
(2) Information that suggests that an individual has failed to follow
appropriate medical advice relating to treatment of a condition, e.g., failure
to take prescribed medication;
(3) A pattern of high-risk, irresponsible, aggressive, antisocial, or
emotionally unstable behavior; or
(4) Information that suggests that the individual’s current behavior
indicates a defect in his judgment or reliability.
Mitigating Conditions:
(1) There is no indication of a current problem;
(2) Recent opinion by a credentialed mental health professional that an
individual’s previous emotional, mental, or personality disorder is cured,
under control, or in remission, and has a low probability of recurrence or
exacerbation;
(3) The past emotional instability was a temporary condition (e.g., one
caused by a death, illness, or marital breakup), the situation has been
resolved, and the individual is no longer emotionally unstable.
Comments
In the past, individuals holding positions requiring access to classified
information were often afraid to get or to report any type of psychological
counseling for fear that any contact with a mental health counselor would result
in the loss of a clearance. Executive Order 12968 specifically addressed that
concern stating: "No negative inference... may be raised solely on the
basis of mental health counseling. Such counseling can be a positive factor in
eligibility determinations. If mental health counseling is indicated, the
executive order allows further inquiry to determine if the Adjudicative
Guidelines have been satisfied.
The guideline recognizes that mental health counseling may be necessary and
temporary at times of personal stress, such as a death in the family, illness,
or marital problems. It further recognizes that many mental health problems that
in the past were intractable are now curable or can be controlled by medication.
Nevertheless, serious mental disorders that do not respond to medical treatment
will bar an individual from access to classified information.
Behavior that does not rise to the level of a serious mental disorder can
still result in the loss of a clearance, and it is this category that is the
most problematic. Included among this concern are "personality
disorders" that can cause "a significant deficit in an individual’s
social and occupational functioning." The disqualifying conditions may be
"a pattern of high-risk, irresponsible, aggressive, antisocial, or
emotionally unstable behavior." Assessment of behavior in this category is
the most subjective and may depend as much on the personality of the
investigator as on the applicant for a clearance. Under the guideline,
theoretically an engineer who liked to race motorcycles on the weekend might be
considered to exhibit "high-risk, irresponsible" behavior, or a
physicist who was unconcerned about his clothing fashion might be viewed as
showing a deficit in social functioning, or a computer programmer who did not
socialize with his coworkers might be considered to have a deficit in his
occupational functioning. In general, however, only if a credible credentialed
mental health professional were to say that the personality characteristics
affected the person’s judgment and reliability in ways that made him
untrustworthy would the clearance be denied or revoked. This is a difficult of
line to draw, and one that could eliminate the most brilliant from working on
the national defense, if judged by their eccentric and nonstandard habits. A
common sense approach becomes most important in separating behavior that simply
varies from social standards to that which is an identifiable mental health
condition.
Guideline J—Criminal Conduct
The Concern. A history or pattern of criminal activity creates doubt about a
person’s judgment, reliability and trustworthiness.
Disqualifying Conditions:
(1) Allegations or admissions of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the
person was formally charged; or
(2) A single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses.
Mitigating Conditions:
(1) The criminal behavior was not recent;
(2) The crime was an isolated incident;
(3) The person was pressured or coerced into committing the act, and those
pressures are no longer present in that person’s life;
(4) The person did not voluntarily commit the act, and/or the factors leading
to the violation are not likely to recur;
(5) Acquittal; or
(6) There is clear evidence of successful rehabilitation.
Comments
Conviction of a serious crime will certainly cause the denial or revocation
of a security clearance. What becomes questionable is when there has
been no conviction. Often, criminal charges will not be reported by the
individual involved because the charge has been dismissed, or the conviction was
later expunged. The charge may be later discovered as part of a personnel
clearance investigation of local criminal records or FBI indexes, thus creating
further problems for the subject in explaining why their response to the
Security Questionnaire was incomplete.
For the purposes of a security clearance, it is not the outcome of the charge
that is important, but the nature and gravity of the underlying conduct and the
reason for the dismissal or expungement of the charge. If a dismissal is for
technical reasons, such as untimeliness in bringing the charge or as a result of
a policy of leniency for first offenders, the underlying charges will be
considered as part of the security review. If the dismissal or acquittal was
because there was no factual basis to the charge, that, too, will be considered.
Multiple, less serious offenses, or offenses that might be considered
"administrative," may also be reason for denying or revoking a
clearance. Among these is failure to file stale or Federal income tax returns.
Though no taxes may have been owed, and the taxing authorities imposed only
civil penalties, because there are statutes that do provide for criminal
penalties, a violation on this basis may be sustained. A series of minor traffic
offenses, each of which individually would not be considered sufficient, in the
aggregate might also be considered a violation of this guideline as evidencing
at least a disregard of societal rules.
Guideline K—Security Violations
The Concern. Noncompliance with security regulations raises doubt about an
individual’s trustworthiness, willingness, and ability to safeguard classified
information.
Disqualifying Conditions:
(1) Unauthorized disclosure of classified information; or
(2) Violations that are deliberate or multiple or due to negligence.
Mitigating Conditions:
Actions that:
(1) Were inadvertent;
(2) Were isolated or infrequent;
(3) Were due to improper or inadequate training; or
(4) Demonstrate a positive attitude towards the discharge of security
responsibilities.
Comments
Failure to comply with security regulations is viewed as among the most
serious of violations of the guidelines, as it goes to the very heart of the
security process. Willful disclosure of classified information will
certainly lead to the revocation of a clearance and may result in criminal
prosecution, even if not done with subversive intent. Repeated
unintentional infractions, even if minor, may also lead to the revocation of a
clearance. Examples are inadvertently shredding a classified document without
properly accounting for it or leaving a computer disc in a desk drawer at the
end of the day, rather than locking
it
in an authorized safe. Such conduct is considered indicative of a lack of the
diligence required for the protection of classified information. While a first
or second violation may result in a reprimand, subsequent infractions of
security regulations, even if unintentional and not causing a compromise of
classified information, will likely lead to the revocation of
a clearance.
Guideline L—Outside
Activities
The Concern. Involvement in certain types of outside employment or activities
is of security concern if it poses a conflict with an individual’s security
responsibilities and could create an increased risk of unauthorized disclosure
of classified information.
Disqualifying Conditions:
Any service, whether compensated, volunteered or employed, with:
(1) A foreign country;
(2) A foreign national;
(3) A representative of any foreign interest; or
(4) A foreign, domestic, or international organization or person engaged in
analysis, discussion, or publication of material on intelligence, defense,
foreign affairs, or protected technology.
Mitigating Conditions:
(1) Evaluation of the outside employment or activity indicates that it does
not pose a conflict with an individual’s security responsibilities; or
(2) The individual terminates the employment or discontinues the activity
upon being notified that it is in conflict with his security responsibilities.
Comments
Activities most likely to cause concern under this guideline are memberships
in scientific and technical professional organizations.’81 Such
organizations frequently publish research that, although not classified, may
relate to the classified work being done by the cleared individual. Of concern
is the possibility of disclosure, at meetings or symposia, of unclassified
information gained through classified research, being combined with other
unclassified information to give insight into classified work. Obtaining prior
authorization by the cleared individual to attend meetings or to make such
presentations is probably the safest way to avoid the possibility of a violation
of this guideline.
Guideline M—Misuse of Information Technology Systems
The Concern. Noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines, or regulations
pertaining to information technology systems may raise security concerns about
an individual’s trustworthiness, willingness, and ability to properly protect
classified systems, networks, and information. Information technology systems
include all related equipment used for the communication, transmission,
processing, manipulation, and storage of classified or sensitive information.
Disqualifying Conditions:
(1) Illegal or unauthorized entry into any information technology system;
(2) Illegal or unauthorized modification, destruction, manipulation, or
denial of access to information residing on an information technology system; or
(3) Removal or use of hardware, software, or media from any information
technology system without authorization, when specifically prohibited by rules,
procedures, guidelines, or regulations.
Mitigating Conditions:
(1) The misuse was not recent or significant;
(2) The conduct was unintentional or inadvertent;
(3) The introduction or removal of media was authorized;
(4) The misuse was an isolated event; or
(5) The misuse was followed by a prompt, good-faith effort to correct the
situation.
Comments
Although it would appear that the information technology systems to which
this guideline refers are those used for classified or sensitive systems, in the
several reported cases from DOHA and DOE it has been applied to non-classified
and non-government computers and to commercial copyrighted software. The use of a
non-classified government computer for viewing "adult" material on the
Internet has been the basis for denying a security clearance. Like
the other guidelines, willful and criminal violations of this guideline will
assuredly cause loss of a clearance. The unintentional or non-criminal violations
are more frequently the subject of a security investigation.
The occasional use of a personal computer for preparing a shopping list or a
personal letter, while an unauthorized use of government property, is far from a
rarity. The use of Tempest-shielded computers for such a purpose, however, puts
the use on an information technology system that the guideline specifically
addresses. Although the preparation of a personal letter or shopping list is a
violation of the guideline, it is the more serious misuse of equipment used to
process, manipulate, or store classified or sensitive data that is of greater
concern. Taking home a computer disc containing classified information to work
on it, though well-intentioned, is a prohibited violation. Failing to remove and
secure a hard drive containing classified information at the end of the workday
is another violation. It is such actions, although well-intentioned or
inadvertent, that area cause of security concern.
